On Combat

This week combat commanders rejected a recommendation by Army psychiatric community to control operational stress through frequent in theater rotations. (See USA Today 19 June 2007: “Troop’s 1-Month Break Blocked“) The specific recommendation was for units to rotate out of the line for one month out of every four. The benefits would include maintenance of unit cohesion and the opportunity for solders to decompress as units, which is vastly superior to decompression as individuals. In theory this approach would focus on combat troops—those spending their days outside the wire and needing decompression opportunities the most (but benefiting from current in-theater R+R the least according to the latest report in Mental Health Assessment Team report IV–MHAT IV).

Realities of ground combat in Iraq

The recommendation was an apparent non-starter due to the troop requirements of the current ground strategy. With US ground forces doing the bulk of the fighting and holding for the foreseeable future (see Washington Post, 26 June 2007 General: Iraqi Forces Far From Self-Sufficiency), there aren’t enough grunts in all of America’s armed services combined to do the job in Iraq. Even with the surge, twenty combat brigades are doing a job that requires somewhere on the order of one hundred combat brigades. When one is desperately short, how can a commander pull out 25% of the strength of each unit for in theater rotations? On the other hand, if troop levels will never reach the real requirement of this strategy, how can US commanders not afford to make a decision to sustain the combat capability of the personnel (and ultimately, units) we have now? Intentionally “eating our seed corn” by psychologically burning out our forces is a significant strategic risk—hopefully the probability of success in this surge justifies the risk.

Better Case Needed by the Medics

One step the Army medical community can do to strengthen its recommendation is to better articulate and substantiate the requirement for rotation. Although many have a gut feel that R+R is necessary to combat operation stress, MHAT IV does little to make the case. How much rotation out of line will reduce residual stress levels? How long? Does rotation into the sanctuary of the forward operation base (FOB) serve the same purpose? (note: our sanctuaries seem to becoming less safe, see this month’s Miami Herald’s: Green Zone Targeted Again) Unfortunately MHAT IV doesn’t provide any data on these questions, and it actually undermines its case by indicating residual stress doesn’t reset even after a year’s rotation back to the US (see American Soldier’s Finite Well of Courage).